Due to its significant advantages, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are now widely deployed in various areas to collect and transmit the required data. To ensure only authorized users can login to WSNs, many user authentication schemes based on password and smart card have been proposed. Most recently, Farash et al. and Kumari et al. subsequently proposed an efficient user authentication and key agreement scheme for WSNs, respectively. Even though the two above schemes are claimed to be secure under reasonable assumptions, we find that they, in fact, cannot resist offline password guessing attack when the secret values stored in the smart card are revealed, and also fail to provide forward secrecy. To overcome these security weaknesses, we propose Information Technology and Control 2018/2/47 276 a novel user authentication scheme for WSNs by introducing Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The security analysis and performance discussion demonstrate that the proposed scheme is secure against various well known attacks, and also is efficient enough. Thus, it is more desirable for securing communications in WSMs.
Introduction
A wireless sensor network (WSN) usually consists of a large number of autonomous sensor nodes, which only have limited capacity of computation and storage. Specifically, in a WSN, the sensor nodes are in charge of sensing required data and forwarding them to a nearby gateway node (GWN), which is regarded as a computation-efficient node, and a valid user is allowed to access these sensor nodes and obtain the collected data. Nowadays, WSNs are widely deployed in many areas, such as healthcare monitoring, environment monitoring, military sensing and tracking, measurement of seismic activity and so on.
Originally, the data collected by sensor nodes are transmitted over a public channel. This implies that an adversary can maliciously delete, intercept the transmitted data, and further destroy the usability and the reliability of the WSN. Particularly, when the data involve sensitive and valuable information, the above security issues become more serious. Therefore, it is necessary to deploy security mechanisms in WSNs for securing communications. Among available security mechanisms designed for WSNs, the user authentication protocol based on password and smart card receives a substantial attention from researchers [34, 31, 18, 17, 19, 16, 15, 10, 33, 9, 5] since it can provide mutual two-factor authentication and establish a shared session key between protocol participants. In addition, this kind of authentication scheme is convenient to be implemented in WSNs, without mandatory requirement for public key infrastructure as in the setting of certificate based authentication scheme.
Compared with user authentication schemes [2, 25, 26, 13] that are solely based on password, the two-factor authentication scheme based on password and smart card, as its name suggests, provides stronger security guarantee. Concretely, in the setting of this kind of authentication scheme, each user holds a password with low entropy and a smart card storing some secret values. The password and smart card of each user are bonded together by the gateway node. Consequently, a user intending to validly access a sensor node must provide the correct password and the corresponding smart card simultaneously. In order to capture the security of the two-factor authentication scheme based on password and smart card, Xu et al. [36] suggest that the following two assumptions on the adversary's capabilities should be explicitly made: _ The adversary is allowed to record, insert, delete, or modify any message transmitted over the public channel.
_ The adversary can either obtain a user's smart card and then extract secret values in it by the method introduced by Kocher et al. [21] and Messerges et al. [27] , or get a user's password, but not the both.
For a two-factor authentication scheme based on password and smart card, it is required that the scheme should remain secure under the above two assumptions. This has been widely approved in the literature of two-factor authentication scheme, and the security analysis of lots of such authentication schemes [14, 35, 23, 28, 32, 3, 11, 12] follows from the above assumptions. In 2009, Das [6] proposed a two-factor user authentication scheme for WSNs by using one-way hash function and exclusive-OR operation, and demonstrated that the proposed scheme can resist many well known attacks. Unfortunately, several subsequent works [29, 4, 37] show that Das's scheme [6] is vulnerable to offline password guessing attack, sensor node compromising attack, gateway node bypassing attack and privileged insider attack. Subsequently, even there are several protocols [20, 1] proposed to conquer the above security pitfalls, they still suffer from various other attacks. For example, Yuan [38] pointed out that Khan and Algahathbar's [20] scheme does not provide non-repudiation and fails to achieve mutual authentication between the user and the gateway node. Most recently, Farash et al. [7] proposed a user authentication scheme for WSN based on password and smart card to overcome the identified security weaknesses in Turkanovic et al.'s [30] scheme, and Kumari et al. [22] introduced another efficient scheme for user authentication and key agreement for WSN.
In this paper, we find that Farash et al.'s [7] scheme suffers from offline password guessing attack, sensor node spoofing attack, and fails to provide anonymity and forward secrecy. We also point out that Kumari et al.'s [22] scheme is vulnerable to offline password guessing attack when the smart card is lost, and thus fails to provide the security guarantee as a two-factor authentication scheme should do. To conquer the security pitfalls in the above two schemes, we propose a novel user authentication scheme based on password and smart card by introducing Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Security analysis and performance discussion show that not only does the proposed scheme achieve intended security properties, but it also has moderate computation cost and communication overhead, and thus is more desirable for securing communications in WSNs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce Farash et al.'s [7] scheme and present the security pitfalls in this scheme. In Section 3, we briefly review Kumari et al.'s [22] scheme and demonstrate that this scheme suffers from offline password guessing attack. The details of the improved scheme is given in Section 4. In Section 5 and Section 6, we discuss the security and performance of the proposed scheme. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 7.
Security Analysis of Farash et al.'s Scheme

Review of Farash et al.'s Scheme
Farash et al.'s [7] authentication scheme involves three participants, i.e., a user U i , a sensor node S j and the gateway node GWN. Initially, the gateway node selects a secure one-way hash function h( . ), and chooses a random nonce X GWN as its master secret key. In addition, it assigns an identity SID j and a shared secret value X GWN-Sj for each sensor node S j . Then, U i and S j need to register with the gateway node GWN. During this process, GWN will issue a smart card SC i containing several secret values to U i through a private channel, and distribute some other secret values to S j over the public channel by using the previously shared secret value X GWN-Sj . After that, whenever the user U i wants to access the sensor node S j , they have to authenticate each other by the help of the gateway node GWN, and establish a shared session key for securing subsequent communications.
Specifically, Farash et al.'s scheme consists of three phases, namely, registration phase, authentication phase and password change phase. We now briefly review each phase of this scheme. The notations used throughout this paper are summarized in Table 1 .
Registration Phase
The registration phase is comprised of two parts, user registration and sensor node registration. As shown in Figure 1 , whenever a user U i wants to register with Step 2. Upon receipt of
RMfrom U i , the gateway node GWN first checks U i 's identity, and then successively computes = ( || )
e f g to the user U i . Step 3. After receiving SC i from the gateway node GWN, the user U i writes the previously selected random nonce r i into SC i .
As depicted in Figure 2 , for a sensor node S j holding an identity SID j and a shared secret value GWN S j X -, it registers with the gateway node GWN by carrying out the following steps:
Step 1. The sensor node S j first selects a random nonce r j and gets the current timestamp T 1 
Here, T 2 is the current timestamp. Then, the gateway node GWN returns the response message
to the sensor node S j . Meanwhile, it deletes SID j and GWN S j X -.
Step 3. 
If not, S j also aborts the registration. Otherwise, it stores j x ′ and Sensor node j S Gateway node GWN Select a random nonce j r
Meanwhile, S j erases the previously shared secret value
Authentication Phase
Whenever a user U i wants to access a sensor node S j , he/she has to complete mutual authentication and establish a shared session key for securing subsequent communications with the help of the gateway node GWN. Concretely, as depicted in Figure 3 , the authentication procedure is performed as follows: Step 1. 
After that, the sensor node S j sends the message
Step 5. When receiving the message 
If not, SC i also terminates the session. At this point, U i and S j complete mutual authentication and share a common session key = ( )
Password Change Phase
In this phase, a user U i is allowed to update his/her password offline. To this end, the user U i and the smart card SC i interactively perform as follows:
Step 1. The user U i inserts the smart card SC i into a card reader and inputs the identity ID i and the password PW i .
Step 2. 
After that, the smart card SC i requires U i to input a new password.
Step 3. The user U i selects and inputs a new password new i PW .
Step 4. The smart card computes = ( || ), 
Security Pitfalls of Farash et al.'s Protocol
In this section, we demonstrate that Farash et al.'s [7] scheme suffers from offline dictionary attack with smart card lost and sensor node spoofing attack with sensor node capture. In addition, we also show that this protocol fails to achieve anonymity and forward secrecy. Here, we emphasize that we discuss the security of Farash et al.'s protocol under the same threat assumption as adopted in [7] .
Offline Dictionary Attack
In this attack, an adversary  first observes an authentication instance executed among a user U i , a sensor node S j and the gateway node GWN, and records these messages
AM -, which are transmitted over a public channel. Then,  obtains the user U i 's smart card SC i and extracts the values , ,
r e f and i g stored in SC i by using technologies introduced in [21, 27] . After that, the adversary  launches offline dictionary attack by conducting the following steps:
Step 1. Establish a password dictionary space i  .
Step 2. Select a candidate password * i PW from the dictionary space i  , and compute
as well as
Step 3. Check the validity of * i PW using one of the following manners: 
and verify if
* ,3 ,3 = MGN MGN M M . _ Compute * * ,1 3 = ( || ) j GWN i K M h d T ⊕ , * * * = ( ) i j SK h K K ⊕ * * * = ( ) i j SK h K K ⊕ and * * ,3 ,1 ,3 4 = ( || || || ) j GWN GWN M h SK M M T ,1 ,3 4 | || || ) GWN GWN M M T ,
, which is nearly negligible. On the other hand, since passwords are usually generated in a personal way such that they can be easily memorable by human beings, the size of the dictionary space i  will be very limited. Thus, once a user's smart card is lost, an adversary can recover the correct password within seconds by running the above attack procedure on a PC. After that, as shown in the fourth check manner, with the recovered correct password i PW , the adversary can further get the user's identity i ID . As a result, the adversary  can legitimately access any sensor node on behalf of the user U i just by obeying the authentication mechanism.
Sensor Node Spoofing Attack
In this attack, an adversary  first corrupts a sensor node S c , and obtains the identity SID c and the secret values c x ,
GWN h X . Then, the adversary  impersonates any sensor node S j a user U i is trying to access. The details of this attack are as follows:
Step 1. When the user U i sends the message to the gateway node GWN.
Step 2. When receiving the message
S GWN c
AMfrom the sensor node S c , the gateway node GWN performs the same as in Step 3 of the authentication phase. Since the message U S i j AM -does not contain any information about the intended sensor node identity j SID , the gateway node GWN does not know that this message is originally sent to S j , rather than S c . On the other hand, the adversary  has the correct values c x and ( ||1)
GWN
h X , and thus can pass through the verification of the gateway node GWN. Hence, the gateway node would conclude that the message
AMis correct and return the response message
Step 3. After receiving the message 
= ( || || || )
, , } j M T T to the user U i .
Step 4. 
are two random values independently chosen by two protocol participants, a user U i and a sensor node S j . Thus, once eitherm U i 's smart card and password are compromised or S j 's secret value j x is revealed, an adversary can recover K i and K j from those messages transmitted over public channel, and further obtain the session key = ( ) 
Security Analysis of Kumari et al.'s Scheme
Kumari et al. [22] proposed a new authentication protocol for WSN to partially conquer the above security pitfalls in Farash et al.'s [7] protocol. Roughly speaking, the two authentication protocols have the similar structure. For the limit of space, we just briefly review the user registration phase and login phase of Kumari et al.'s protocol, and then show that this protocol suffers from offline password guessing attack when the smart card is lost.
A Brief Review of Kumari et al.' Scheme
In the user registration phase of Kumari et al.'s [22] scheme, a user U i registers with GWN by carrying out the following steps:
Step In the login phase, the user U i performs the following operations:
Step 1. U i inserts the smart card SC i into a device reader and inputs his/her identity ID i and password or not. If not, the smart card terminates the login process.
Step 2. In the case that ID i and i PW ′ are both correct, the smart card SC i further computes = ( || )
. The smart card then picks a random number K i and continues to calculate 1 T is the current time stamp on the user side and j SID is the identity of the sensor node S j to be accessed. Finally, the smart card sends the login request message
M h M M SID K T , where
to the sensor node S j via a public channel.
Security Pitfalls in Kumari et al.'s Protocol
In this section, we demonstrate that Kumari et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to offline password guessing attack when the smart card is lost. In Kumari et al's protocol, since a user U i needs to provide his/her identity ID i and password PW i simultaneously in the login phase, they have the same feature. Namely, they are both easy to remember and thus suffer from the threat of offline password guessing attack.
After obtaining a login request message e f g c y h ⋅ from SC i . Then, the adversary  launches offline dictionary attack by conducting the following steps:
Step 1. Establish a password dictionary space pw  and an identity dictionary space id  , respectively. Step 2. Select a candidate password 
Step 3. Check the validity of Step 4. If 
T T + 
, which is nearly negligible.
We note that the above attack implies that an adversary can directly recover a user's identity and password simultaneously. Thus, the protocol naturally fails to achieve user anonymity. In addition, similar to Farash et al.'s protocol, Kumari et al.'s protocol also cannot provide forward secrecy since the authentication procedure only involves XOR operation, and an adversary can thus utilize the secret key of the gateway node to recover all secret values from those transmitted messages.
The Proposed Protocol
In this section, we propose an improved authentication protocol AP that conquers the security pitfalls in Farash et al.'s [7] protocol and Kumari et al.'s [22] protocol. Next, we provide the details of the protocol.
Similarly, there are three kinds of participants in the protocol AP, namely, a user U i , a sensor node S j and the gateway node GWN. Initially, the gateway node GWN chooses an elliptic curve group G with prime order p. Let g be a random generator of G. GWN also chooses a secure one-way hash function * ( ) :{0,1} {0,1} h ⋅ →  . Then, the gateway node GWN selects a random integer * GWN p X ∈ Z as its long-term secret key. For each sensor node S j , the gateway node GWN assigns a unique identity j SID to identify S j , and stores a secret value = ( || )
x h SID X into S j 's memory before deploying it into the network. This, in fact, completes S j 's registration to the gateway node. We now describe the details of the protocol AP.
Registration Phase
In this phase, a user U i wanting to access any sensor node registers with the gateway node GWN. As shown in Figure 4 , the user U i and the gateway node GWN interactively complete the registration process by carrying out the following steps:
Step 1. U i selects an identity ID i and a password PW i , as well as a random nonce Step 2. After receiving
RMfrom U i , the gateway node GWN first checks the uniqueness of ID i , namely, whether ID i is occupied by the other registered users. If yes, the gateway node GWN prompts U i to choose a new identity. Otherwise, GWN selects a random nonce * i p t ∈ Z , and then successively computes = ( || )
f TID to the user U i , and stores the tuple ( , ) i i t TID into the user database.
Step 3. Upon receipt of SC i from GWN, the user U i writes the previously selected random nonce r i into SC i .
Authentication Phase
In this phase, a user U i intending to access a sensor node S j authenticates against S j to ensure that S j is a valid sensor node deployed by the gateway node GWN. Meanwhile, the sensor node S j verifies U i 's validity to avoid unauthorized access. When they successfully complete mutual authentication, a shared session key is established for securing subsequent communications between U i and S j . Concretely, as depicted in Figure 5 , the authentication procedure is executed in the following manner: Step 2. Upon receipt of g . Then, it gets the current timestamp 2 T , and computes the two values
Subsequently, it sends the authentication request message = { , ,
to the gateway node GWN.
Step 3. After receiving S GWN j AMfrom S j , the gateway node GWN checks the validity of 2 T and 
If not, S j aborts this session. Otherwise, S j further checks whether it holds that 
Step is revealed, an adversary can utilize it to launch offline password guessing attack. This is also why we adopt an online manner of updating password. Namely, a smart card in the protocol AP does not contain any information that can be directly used to check the validity of the corresponding password.
Security Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the security of the protocol AP. Specifically, we demonstrate that AP can withstand various well-known attacks, including offline password guessing attack, user/sensor node impersonation attack, parallel and reflection attack, reply attack and privileged insider attack. We also show that AP features desired security properties, such as mutual authentication, user anonymity and key agreement.
Offline Password Guessing Attack
Assuming an adversary  has obtained a legal user U i 's smart card i SC , from which  extracted { , , }
. Moreover, we suppose that  also has recorded these authentication messages 
Reflection Attack
In a reflection attack, when an honest protocol participant sends to an intended communication partner for the later to perform a cryptographic process, an adversary  intercepts the message and simply sends it back to the message originator. In such an attack,  tries to deceive the message originator into believing that the reflected message is expected by the originator from the intended communication partner, either as a response to, or as a challenge for, the originator. If  is successful, the message originator would either accept an "answer" to a question which was, in fact, asked and answered by the originator itself, or would provide  with an oracle service which  needs but cannot provide to itself.
In the proposed protocol, a user U i sends the message AM -from U i , respectively. For the same reason, the adversary  also cannot utilize these messages to launch reflection attack. Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against reflection attack.
Replay Attack
In a message replay attack, an adversary  has recorded a old message from a preceding instance of a protocol and now replays the recorded message in a new instance of this protocol. To eliminate this attack against the proposed protocol, we use timestamp and random nonce to guarantee the freshness of exchanged messages among communication partners. Specifically, note that each message in the proposed protocol is associated with the corresponding timestamp, which implies that if  wants to replay these messages, then it has to modify the previous timestamps. For the recorded old mes- K is recovered from the received message. Therefore, U i and j S have the same influence on the value of the shard session key, namely, neither principal can control the shared secret value. This realizes the security goal of key agreement.
Weak User Anonymity
In the context of the proposed protocol, user anonymity requires that the real identity i ID of a registered user U i keeps hidden from anyone, except the gateway node GWN. An intuitive strategy of achieving this goal is to encrypt all transmitted messages using a symmetric encryption algorithm. However, this forces each user to share a high-entropy key with the gateway node, which will bring heavy workload of managing these keys for the gateway node GWN. On the other hand, since the shared symmetric key is with high-entropy, the user U i has to store it into the smart card. As a result, this mechanism would fail once the smart card is lost. In Farash et al.'s protocol, the authors adopt a similar approach. That is, all users share the same key ( ) GWN h X with the gateway node GWN, and all sensor nodes also share the same key ( ||1)
GWN
h X with the gateway node. This may be even worse since any malicious user can get other user's real identity from those publicly transmitted messages.
In our protocol, we employ a simple method to provide user anonymity. Specifically, the gateway node stores a tuple ( , )
i i t TID for each user U i and assigns = ( || )
TID ID h t X ⊕ to U i as its provisional identity. We note that each user's provisional identity is the same in all authentication procedures. This implies that although an adversary cannot get the real identity of a user, it can identify the user in different sessions. Therefore, our scheme provides weak user anonymity.
Performance Discussions
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed protocol in terms of security property and computation cost by comparing it with other related works.
In Table 2 , we summarize the security properties of the listed schemes. We can see that early schemes [6, 20, 38] are designed to only achieve user authentication, without considering the functionality of key agreement. In addition, as a special attack against Kumari et al. WSNs, except Kumari et al.'s [22] and our scheme, all listed schemes suffer from sensor node spoofing attack. Note that all listed schemes are two-factor authentication protocols based on smart card and password. This implies that these schemes should remain secure even if the secret values stored in the smart card are revealed. However, all these schemes, except our scheme, are vulnerable to offline password guessing attack when the smart card is lost. That is, they fail to achieve the required security guarantee of the two-factor authentication scheme. In addition, by introducing Diffi-Hellman key exchange, only our scheme can provide perfect forward secrecy, which ensures the security of previously used session keys when the gateway node is corrupted. Table 3 presents the computation cost of each protocol participant in each listed scheme. These schemes mainly involve two kinds of cryptographic operations, namely, exponentiation operation and hash operation 1 . To be precise, the running time of a hash operation and an exponentiation operation is roughly 0.00032 s and 0.0192 s [24, 8] , respectively. Das et al.'s [6] scheme is the most efficient one. However, the development process of this kind of two-factor authentication scheme demonstrates that security is the first goal and major motivation of designing such an authentication. Even though our scheme consumes more computation resource, it overcomes security 1 Relatively, since the running time of XOR operation is nearly negligible, we thus ignore it.
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